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Summary findings
The story of Mexico's involvement  in international  observed  earlier in Mexico's history. Foreign capital
capital markets is one of riches to rags and back to riches  inflows  were dominated by foreign  direct investment  and
again.  Four pcriods can be distinguished:  especially  portfolio investment  and, unlike in the second
* Stable,  steady international  borrowing through the  period, most inflows  financcd  the domestic  private
1950s and 1960s.  sector. Are the current rate and pattern of borrowing -
* Heavy  reliance on international loans through  at levels  unforeseen  at the time of the Brady  deal - a
commercial  bank syndicates  from the mid-1970s until  cause for concern?  Is growth sustainable?
1982.  To answer these questions, Oks and van Wijnbergen
* Massive  capital flight,  zero access  to private lenders,  analyze  the domestic macroeconomic  counterpart of the
and complete reliance on official  sources  from 1982 to  large  capital inflows and high current account deficits  of
1990.  the early 1990s.
- Massive  return of flight  capital, a continued drought  Whether growth is sustainable  depends on the level of
in syndicated  loans, but heavy expansion  of foreign  domestic  saving.  But even if domestic  saving  increases,
direct investnent, portfolio investment,  and bond  the transition to sustainable  growth is unlikely  to be
placement  smooth because  the slowdown  in consumption  growth
Easing  the transition from the third to rh- fourth  (associated  with improved saving)  is likely  to be
period was the restructuring of Mexico's extemal debt  contractionary.
under the Brady deal, which ultimately  reduced - and  The outcome depends on how investment  and net
"smoothened"  - the net transfer to foreign creditors,  exports respond. Oks and van Wijnbergen  analyze
Oks and van Wijnbergen  argue that "smoothening" the  cyclical  and structural  factors of investment  and the
external transfer had far more impact on the domestic  external sector, and their interactions  with Mexico's
economy than the reduction  of debt and debt servicing  exchange  rate and monetary  policy, to interpret the
per se.  recession  in the second half of 1993.
The finandng of the expansion  that ensued in the  They emerge from their analysis  with cautious
fourth period differs dramatically  from what was  optimism  about Mexico's medium-term  prospects.
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I.  Introduction
The story  of Mexico's  involvement  in international  capital  markets is
one  of riches  to rags  back to riches.  Four  periods  can  be clearly
distinguished:  (a)  stable  steady  international  borrowing  throughout  the
fifties  and  sixties;  (b)  explosive  reliance  on  international  borrowing  through
commercial  bank syndicates  from  the  mid-seventies  until  1982;  (c)  massive
capital  flight,  zero access  to private lenders  and  complete  reliance  on
official  sources  from 1982 to 1990; (d)  massive  return  of flight  capital,  a
continued  drought  of syndicated  loans  but strong  expansion  in DFI,  portfolio
investment  and bond  placements.  One of the  key factors  that explain  the
transition  from  c) to  d)  is  the  restructuring  of  Mexico's  external  debt  under
the  Brady  deal.  The  Brady  deal  led  both  to  a  reduction  of  the  net  transfer  to
foreign  creditors  and  to  a  "smoothening"  of  the  net  transfer.  The  hypothesis
that  is  often  offered  to  support  the  need  for  debt  and  debt  service  reduction
in  heavily  indebted  countries  is that  mainly  debt  and  debt  service  reduction
matters.  This  paper  will  argue  that  the  "smoothening"  of  the  external
transfer  had a  much  stronger  domestic  impact  than  the  reduction  of  debt/debt
service  per  se.
The financing  of  the  expansion  that  ensued  during  period  d)  differs
dramatically  from  what  could  be  observed  in any  earlier  period  of  Mexico's
history.  Foreign  capital  inflows  were  dominated  by  foreign  direct  investment
and,  in particular,  portfolio  investment;  and,  unlike  in the  late  197Os-early
1980s,  most  inflows  financed  the  domestic  private  sector.  Is  the  current
pattern  and  rate  of  borrowing,  at  levels  totally  unforeseen  at the time  of the
debt  deal,  a  cause  for  concern?  Is  growth  sustainable?  To  answer  these2
questions,  we look at the domestic  macroeconomic  counterpart  of the  large
capital inflows/high  curren  account deficits  of the  early 1990s.
Growth sustainability  ultimately  depends  on the level  of domestic
saving. However,  even if domestic  saving  increases  from the low level  reached
in 1992-93,  the transition  to a sustainable  growth  path is unlikely  to  be
smooth,  as  the  slowdown  in  consumption  growth  (associated  to the improvement
in  domestic  saving)  is  likely  to  be contractionary. The outcome  will  depend
on  how  investment  and  net  exports  respond.  Our  analysis  of  cyclical  and
structural  factors  of  investment  and  the  external  sector,  and  of  their
interactions  with  Mexico's  exchange  rate  and  monetary  policy,  provides  an
interpretation  of the recession  during  the  second  half  of  1993;  it  also  leads
to a cautious  optimism  over  medium term prospects.
The  paper is organized  as follows.  The  patterns  of  capital  flows  in/out
of  Mexico,  focusing  on  the  events  that  led  to  the  Brady  deal  and  the  dramatic
reversal  of capital  flows  in 1989-1990,  are  discussed  in  Section  II.  The
domestic  impact  of the  Brady deal is analyzed  in Section III.  The
macroeconomic  counterpart  to massive capital  inflows  in 1990-92  and its
implications  for  growth  sustainability  are  examined  in  Section  IV.  The
cyclical  and  structural  factors  of  private  saving,  investment  and  the  external
sector  as  well  as  their  interactions  with  macroeconomic  policy  are  examined  in
Section  V.  The  conclusions  are  in  Section  VI.  Anne- I  provides  an analysis
of  stability  in  Mexican  asset  markets;  Annex  2  presents  an  econometric  model
of  Mexico's  manufacturing  external  sector.3
II  Patterns  of caTital  flows in and  out of Mexico.  2
The fifties  and sixties saw conservative  fiscal  policies,  steady  growth
and low  inflation.  The international  environment  was hospitable  by later
standards,  with  real  interest  rates  well below  Mexico's  own  rate  of  growth
(Figure  1);  as  a  result  Mexico  could  sustain  deficits  on  its  non-interest
current  account  throughout  the  period  while  maintaining  its  debt-output  ratio
at around  twenty  percent.
But oil  discoveries  in the late  seventies  followed  by the second  OPEC
price explosion  in 1979 triggered  a strong  fiscal  expansion  in  Mexico  at the
same time that  banks tried  to recycle  OPEC's  surpluses.  Real interest  rates  on
international  capital  markets  turned  sharply  negative  while  the  strong  fiscal
expansion  fueled  by  skyrocketing  oil  revenues  pushed  up  Mexico's  rate  of
growth.  it  is  a  measure  of  the  extraordinary  push  into  debt  of  the  time  that,
in  spite  of  the  highly  favorable  turn  in  the  output  growth-foreign  interest
rate  differential,  Mexico  doubled  its  debt-output  ratio  between  1974  and  1982.
The  true  measure  of  this  expansion  is  moreover  masked  by  a  strong  real
appreciation,  slowing  down  the  rate of increase  in the  debt-output  ratio;
while  the  latter  only  doubled,  the  real  value  of  Mexico's  external  debt
trippled  in  constant  foreign  prices.
The  monetary  anti-inflation  policies  in  the  US and  the  UK in  1979
sharply  turned  the  international  environment  against  Mexico.  Real  interest
rates  turned  abruptly  positive,  while  oil  prices,  after  the  1979  euphoria,
collapsed  almost  as  fast  as  they  had  gone  up before (Figure  2).  These adverse
shifts  triggered  alarm  bells  about  its  borrowing  strategy  that  went  unheeded
2  Source  for  Figures  in  aLL sections  was INEGI and Bank of  Mexico.4
for  a surprizingly  long time.  Syndicated  bank loans continued  to flow straight
through  1980,  1981 and even 1982.3
The  private sector  inside  Mexico  showed  more foresight:  1981 is the  year
where  capital  flight  exploded  (Figure  3).  The  ensuing  reserve  losses  forced
an  end  to  Mexico's  decades-old  exchange  rate  policy  of  fixing  against  the
dollar.  In August  _982  Mexico announced  suspension  of  debt  service  on  its
commercial  loans,  setting  off the  global  debt crisis.  Access to  private
credit  facilities  stopped  almost  overnight,  ushering in a period  of radical
change  in  Mexico.  in  the  ensuing  6  years,  it  made  large  net  transfers  (on
average  5  of  GDP)  to  its  private  creditors,  as  interest  was  serviced
throughout.  The  domestic  counterpart  of  this  external  transfer  was  an
unparalleled  fiscal  adjustment.  The  public  sector's  non-interest  deficit,  at
8% of  GDP in  1981,  turned  into  a  5  surplus  within  two  years.  Further
tightening  took  place  during  Mexico's  successful  stabilization  program  (1988-
1.991).
Immediately  after  the  debt  crisis,  haxico  turned  sharply  inwards,
putting  all  trade  under  quantity  controls  and  imposing  stringent,  although
ultimately  unsuccesful,  capital  controls.  In  Cambridge  England  fashion,  QRs
were to control  the  balance of payments (BoP),  while fiscal  expansion,  started
in 1984/85,  was to restore  growth. Instead,  a BoP crisis  ensued,  and an IMF
stand  by program  was called  for:  Mexico  had to rely exclusively  on official
creditors.
In 1986,  faced with  natural disaster (the  earthquakes  in Mexico  City in
3  Lending to  parastataLs  may have been encouraged  by explicit  government guarantees;  it  remairs  an
open question  the  degree  to  which  eriding  to  private  borrowers may have been driven  by  "implfeit"  government
guarantees.  In  1953,  after  the  debt  crisis  erupted,  the  government created  a trust  (FICORCA)  whereby the
government absorbed the  reat  exchange  rate  risk  of  foreign  private  debts.S
1985)  and  plummeting  oil  prices,  Mexico  made a volte face  in its  economic
policy.  In the next four  years,  a far reaching  and radical  program  of
economic  reform  was skillfully  designed  and implemented,  with  massive  support
by the  World  Bank and the IMF.  QRs  were almost  abolished,  tariffs  reduced  to
an average  of about 12%, industrial  deregulation  and administrative
streamlining  was  started  and  a  comprehensive  financial  sector  reform
implemented. A basically  bankrupt  banking  system  was  turned  into  a
privatization  success (the  government  received  in excess  of US$12  billion from
the sale  of commercial  banks in 1991-92). The  whole program  was capped  by a
drastic  privatizaton  program,  reducing  the  share of GDP produced  by state
enterprizes  from about  24% in 1985 to 6% in 1992.  Moreover,  when inflation
failed  to respond to the restrictive  fiscal  policies  of the  mid-eighties,  the
government  announced  the "Pacto"  in December  1987,  an agreement  between the
government,  private  firms  and  the  unions  to  stabilize  the  economy  through
further  tightening  of  fiscal  and  monetary  policy,  backed  up  with  temporary
wage  and  price  controls,  and  a  one  year  freeze  of  the  exchange  rate  against
the  dollar.  Afterwards,  the  government  adopted  a  preannounced  crawling  peg
which  was  followed,  since  November  1991,  by an  exchange  rate  band  (with  the
band  floor  fixed  at  the  Novenber,  1991  level  and  the  band  ceiling  following  a
preannounced  crawling  peg  rule).
Throughout  the  period of the  debt  crisis,  i.e.,  between  1982  and  1988,
private  capital  markets  failed  to  provide  Mexico  with  the  breathing  space
needed  to  cover  the  period  between  short  term  costs  and  long  term  benefits  of
the  reform  program.  Instead  Mexico  had  to  rely  on  official  creditors,  who
backed  Mexico's  reforms  with  a  substantial  increase  of  their  exposure  in
Mexico.  For  example,  at  its  peak  in  1991,  the  World  Bank  had  about  12  percent6
of its assets  outstanding  in Mexico. 4
The  Brady  package  for  Mexico's  debt restructuring  started  a period  of
dramatic  reversal. The  package  was implemented  with the  help of a major cash
infusion  by the  World  Bank,  the IMF and  Japan (cf  van Wijnbergen (1991));
private  capital  started  to return  almost  immediately. The Government's
initial  response  was, to let interest  rates fall  rather  than quantities  flow
in; interest  rates  dropped  by twenty  percentage  points within  days of the
announcement  of the package (Figure  4).  Interest  rates increased  towards  the
end of 1989  and  prior to the implementation  of the deal in the first  months  of
1990.  However,  once the package  was implemented,  and once doubts  about
Mexico's  ability  to  finance  the  build  up  of  the  various  guarantee  funds
required  (as  well  as  the  gap  created  by  the  re-timing  of  interest  payments)
were  allayed,  private  money  came  back  and  interest  rates  resumed  a  sharp
downward  trend.
The  analysis  of capital  flight  on which  we draw (Eridean  et alii 1992)
only uses annual  data, so timing  within  1990 cannot  be picked  up; but the
analysis  (cf.  Figure  3) clearly  shows  a dramatic  reversal  in 1991.  For the
first  time  in the  entire  period  covered,  flight  capital  came back.  Recorded
capital  inflows  also  shot  up.  commercial  banks  started  to  issue  Euro  CDs, DFI
shot  up  by  a  factor  of  5  in two  years,  and  portfollo  investment  (largely  in
response  to  the  very  succesful  privatization  program)  soared  (Table  i).  over
4  Some  have  argued that  the continued officiaL  Lending  shows  that  those institutions  are uLtimately
salt  and their  seniority  status of dubious stwiding  CluLow  and Rogoff (1988)).  This is  in  our  vies  a
serious misinterpretation  of events.  Roth institutions  Lent at such  a large scate because  in  their  vies
Mexico's adjustment  policies  deserved  a chance  and were Likely to succeed; economic  efficienrcy accordingly
justified  borrowing  against the future  recovery of output.  Later events clearly  justified  that  vies.  And
as to  seniority,  it  was  the tough commerciaL  barns who  saw  their  debts written  down  in  1989fl0,  whitae  both
the IMF  and  borLd  Bank  Loans  are meticulousLy  serviced,  even  now  when  both have entered a  period of  negative
tronsfers.  One  can  entirely  plausibly  argue that  the commerciaL  banks' failure  to  support Mexico's reform
program  (beyond  debt rescheduling and reLatively  samiL  aunomts  of rnw  money)  was  as shortsighted as their
uncritical  bankroLling of  Lcpez-PortilLoas unsustainabLe  fiscal  expansion  was  in  earLier  periods.7
1991-93,  annual  capital  inflows  to  Mexico  averaged  $27  billion.
But the nature  of capital  flows  was quite  different  from earlier
periods. Large commercial  bank loans  are  clearly  a thing  of the  past;  much of
the  non-equity  part of the  inflows  constitutes  a process  of reintermediation
rather  than  foreigners  investing  in  Mexican  assets;  and foreigners  are taking
a  larger  equity  stake  than  ever  before.
III.  The domestic  impact  of the  Brady  deal.5
In  the  wake  of  the  restructuring  of  Mexico's  external  debt  under  the
Brady  deal,  interest  rates  declined  and  private  fixed  investment  growth
accelerated.
the  conventional  view  is  that  a  reduced  public  sector  transfer  to
foreign  creditors  frees  fiscal  pressures  on  the  domestic  financial  system,
thus  lowering  interest  rates  and  fostering  investment.  According  to  the  *debt
overhang  hypothesis"  (cf.  Krugman),  debt  relief  can  also  foster  investment  by
reducing  expected  taxes  on  future  output.  In  this  section,  we  propose  an
alternative  hypothesis.  In  our  view,  it  was  reduced  uncertainty  (as  measured
by  the  reduced  variance  of  the  transfer  to  foreign  creditors),  not  debt  relief
per  se,  what  mattered  most.
The  Brady  deal  led  both  to  a  reduction  of  the  anticipated  net  transfer
to  foreign  creditors  (NT)  and  to  a  reduction  of  the  variance  of  the
anticipated  net  transfer  (SNT). 6  The  evidence  below  suggests  that  the
reduction  in  the  net  transfer  (NT)  played  an  important  role  in  reducing
country  risk  (as  measured  by  the  interest  differential  between  US Treasury
Bills  and  dollar-indexed  Mexican  Treasury  Bills  of  the  same  maturity).
However,  the  evidence  also  suggests  that  the  reduced  variance  (SNT)  helped
reducing  foreicn exchancre  rate risk (as  measured  by the interest  differential
between  peso-denominated  and  dollar-indexed  Mexican  Treasury  Bills  of  the  same
5  This  section  is  bused on Stijn  Ctlessens,  DanieL Oka  and Sweder van Wijnbergen (1992).
6 See  Ctaessens  et  alLi.  for  a description  of the construction of MT and  SUT.S
maturity),  and that the reduction  of country  risk  was relatively  small
compared  to the reduction  of foreign  exchunge  rate risk.
In order to assess  the domestic  macroeconomic  impact  of the  Brady  deal,
first,  we consider  the impact  on physical  capital  accumulation  and, second,  we
assess  the  impact  on interest  rates.  We then separate  out foreign  exchange
rate risk  from  more general country  risk by analyzing  the response  to the
Brady  deal  of  both  local  currency  and dollar-denominated  Mexican  debt
instruments.
111.1  Debt Relief  and Private Investment
a
Equ. (1)  links  private investment7  to the  measures  of net  transfer  and
variance  of the stream  of anticipated  transfers  using  Ordinary  Least Squares
(OLS):
(1)  log(Ip)  - 2.276  +  0.020*Zog(NT)  - 0.146*log(SNT)  +  0.476*1og(Ip-l)
(3.30) (0.56)  (-3.03)  (2.99)
- 0.69  H-Statistic  - -1.409  F _ 32.62  Sample:  1988.04-1990.12
The  variance  of  net  transfers  enters  with  the  right  sign  and  is  highly
significant.  The  debt  overhang  proxy  (NT)  is  insignificant  and  even  gets  the
"wrong'  sign.  The H-statistic  indicates  absence  of serial  correlation. The
results  suggest  that  NT,  the  proxy for debt overhang,  is  not  significant,  and
that  the  variance  of  the  transfer  variable  is.
111.2  Interest  rates and  debt relief  I: exchange  rate  risk
Consider  next a similar  analysis,  but now for  peso-denominated  domestic
government  debt (CETES)- This asset  allows  us to focus  the analysis  directly
on exchaage  rate expectations  by first looking  at the  rate differential
between  CETES  and  PAGAPE (dollar-indexed  domestic  debt).  The difference  in
7  The monthly index  of  privete  fixed  investment  published  in  'lndicadores  Econanicos"  of  the  Bank of
Mexico.9
currency  denomination  is the  only difference  between the two  debt instruments
and,  so,  it captures  the currency  or foreign  exchange  rate risk (more
specifically,  the  sum of devaluation  expectations  and  the  premium  for exchange
rate uncertainty).  Figure  5 shows  the CETES-PARAFE (TESOBONO)  interest  rate
differential.
Regressing  the interest  rate  differential  corrected  for  preannounced
devaluation,  INTDIFP1 8, on the  same RHS variables  yields:9
(3)  INTDIFF1  *  -0.162  +  0.076*NT  +  0.429*SNT
(-1.01)  (0.81)  (2.56)
R2  - 0.77  DW  - 1.67  Sample:  1988.3  - 1990.12
This regression  indicates  that the variance  of net transfers,  rather  than the
projected  net transfer  itself,  is the  main factor  behind  the  dramatic  interest
rate response  to Mexico's  debt package.
III.3  Interest  rates  and  debt  relief_II:  country  risk
Consider  finally  the differential  between PAGAFE  and  the  one  month  US T-
bill, INTDIFP2. Because  both are  'denominated  in US dollars,  the  difference
between  them  is  a  pure  measure  of  country  risk.  Regressing  nlQTDIFl2'  on  the
variance  and  expected  value  of  the  net  transfer  yields  the  following:
(4)  INTDIFP2  - -0.005  +  0.115*NT  +  0.07*SNT
(0.02)  (1.99)  (0.76)
*  IJJITDIFFZ  =  +lI)  ,)  with  I  for  CETES,  iP"  for  PAGAFE,  and  y  the premrnounced  rate
of devaluation. Note  that  the prearwounced  devaluation was systewaticalLy lower  than the mn of the expected
devaLuation  and the exchange  rate uncertainty  premiut Cmemsured  by  I  - IP19)
9 ALl interest  rate equations were  estimated using the Naximm Likelihood procedure  in  SAS  assuming
first  order  serial  correLation,  as the DU  statistic  in  OLS  regressions alays  Indicated serial  correLation.
31 0TrTTDIFFS  =  (1+  im) (1.i  =a)10
R2 - 0.80  DW - 1.24  Sample:  1988.3 - 1990.12
Now the  variance  of  the  transfer  is  completely  insignificant,  and  the  transfer
itself  is only  borderline  significant. The  DW statistic  is in the  middle  of
the  inconclusive  range  (1.l1-1.36)  for  the  relevant  number  of  degrees  of
freedom;  however regressing  the error  term  on its  own lag  yields  a t-statistic
on the latter's  coefficient  of only 1.35,  EO  we did not apply  any further
error corrections.
These  results  are  strikingly  different  from  the ones obtained  for
investment  and  the  CHTES-PAGAfE interest  rate  differential.  The  variance
plays  no  role,  and  the  transfer  itself  only  marginally,  in explaining  the
interest  rate differential  between PAGAFE  and tne one month  US T-Bill  rate;
ex:hange  rate uncertainty  plays  no role here since  both assets  are dollar
denominated,  and the transfer  effect  captures  the  partial reduction  in country
risk.
111.4  SumminC  UJD
The transfer  effect  is  significant  in explaining  the improvement  of
country risk;  however,  one should  be aware  that the  PAGAEE rate dropped  only 4
percentage  points  after  the  Brady deal.  Redaction in  pure country  risk  thus
explains  only  20  percent  of  the  overall  drop  of  20  percentage  points  in  the
differential  between  CETES and  the  T-bill  rate.  According  to  our  econometric
results,  the entire  drop  Im  the  CETES-PAGAFE differential  (16  nercentaae
points)  can  be  ascribed  to  the  variance  effect,  and  the  entire  4  Dercentawe
noints  drop  in  the  PAGAFE/US Treasury  bill  differential  to  the  transfer
effect.  Our econometric  results  thus show  that the  variance effect  was
substantially  more  important  in  explaining  the  interest  rate  decline  after  the
Brady  package  than  the  debt  overhang  hypothesis.
The  most  important  conclusion  that  follows  from  our  results  is  that  the
likely  impact  of  debt  restructuring-cum-debt  service  relief  can  be  much  larger
than  the  magnitude  of  the  relief  per  se  coupled  with  standard  growth  models
would  suggest.  The  secondary  effects  on  private  investment  through  reduced
future  uncertainty  are  likely  to  he  more  impo-tant  than  the  direct  amount  of
the  relief  itself.  our  results  point  out  specifically  at  the  favorable11
impact  on  uncertainty  about  future  exchange  rate  crises  as  the  dominant  factor
in  explaining  the  investment  and  growth  response  to  debt  relief.
An important  qualification  follows  also,  however,  almost as a
corrollary;  these  secondary  effects through  reduced  uncertainty  will obviously
not come into  play unless  other,  potentially  dominant  sources  of future  policy
uncertainty  have been removed  first.  Thus the  successful  domestic  reform
program  that the Mexican  government  put through  in the  years  nreceding the
debt  package  was a necessary  precondition  for it to be successful.
IV. Is arowth sustainable  after  the Brady  deal?
The longer  maturities  and increased  share  of fixed-interest  debt  that
the  Brady  deal  brought  about,  along  with the  larger  share  of risk capital  that
is  associated  with high  foreign  investment  in the  post-Brady  deal era, help to
reduce  Mexico's  vulnerability  to a potential  crisis. However,  much of the
inflow  is  clearly a stock adjustment rather than a continuing  flow: the
privatization  program  is  basically  over,  and  Mexicans  can  bring their money
back  in  only  once.  This  raises  the  issue  of  sustainability  once  again,  the
more  so  because  the  whole  process  has  been  accompanied  by  an  unprecedented
deterioration  in  Mexico's  current  account  balance.  Mexico's  current  account
deficit  balance  declined  from  a  US$3.8  billion  surplus  in  1987  to  an  annual
US$24  billion  deficit  on  average  in  1992-93  (Figure  6).
A simole  calculation  based  on  recent  patterns  of  saving,  investment  and
growth indicate  that,  at 1993 levels  of saving,  the  1990-92  rates of growth
were not sustainable. For the economy  to grow  at 3.6%,  the average  growth  in
1990-92,  given an average  ICOR (incremental  capital-output  ratio)  of 5.8 for
the  same period, aggregate  investment  ought  to  be around  21% of GDP (3.6  times
5.8)-  Based on  the  most recent  domestic  saving  figures,  16% of GDP during  1993
(using  preliminary  constant  price  national  accounts  data),  achieving  the  above
investment  rate  requires  foreign  saving  of  about  5% of  GDP.  For  growth  to  be12
sustained,  net  foreign  liabilities  cannot  grow  systematically  faster  than  GDP.  1
Given  net  foreign  liabilities  (debt  and  equity)  in  a  range  equivalent  to  25%-
50% of  GDP,  it  follows  that  foreign  liabilities  (i.e.,  foreign  saving)  are
growing  at  an  annual  rate  in  excess  of  10%  (5  divided  by  50),  which  is  about
three  times  the rate of output  growth  in 1990-92  or more.
Around three-quarters  of the increase  in foreign  saving,  i.e.,  the
decline  in  the  current  account  balance,  and public saving  between  198B-89  and
1992  was  accounted  for  by  declining  private  swring;  only  about  one-quarter  was
accounted  for  by  higher  investment  (Table  2).  3  Even  if  domestic  saving  was
at a high enough level  to  support  sustainable  economic  growth,  a  continuation
of  the  recent  downward  trend  in  domestic  and,  in  particular,  private  saving
(Table  2)  could  turn  growth  unsustainable.Note  that  without  the  sharp
improvement  in  net  public  saving  (public  saving  minus  public  investment)  the
decline  in  domestic  saving  and,  hence,  the  decline  in  the  current  account
balance,  would  have been substantially  larger.
V. Will saving  imnrove?  If so.  can a recession  be avoided?
Private  saving  should improve  in  the  future  (Subsection  V.1).  However,
the  contractionary  effects  of  the  slowdown  in  consumption  are  unlikely  to be
offset  in the short term by  stronger  net  exports  (Subsection  V.2).  Over  the
medium  term,  structural  factors  are likely  to induce  an investment-driven  and,
eventally,  export-driven  recovery (Subsection  V.3).
21  This coandition stems  from the  differentiating  the  foltowing  steady  state  condition:  NFL/Y  c (=)  c
(NFL is  net  foreign  liabiLities,  Y is  GDP  and c  is  a  constant).
12  The estimate  of  private  saving  was based on current  price  data;  using  constant price  national
accounts,  the  share  of  investment  to  GDP  increases  2.9  percentage  points  (instead  of  2.2  p.p.)  and,  ceteris
paribus,  would impty that  investment  is  accounting  for  a  reLativeLy  larger  share  of  the  deterioration  in  the
current  account deficit.  Current  price  national  accounts data  for  1993 was not  avaitabte  and so,  TabLe 2
only  shows the  decLine  in  domestic  saving  to  1992.  Measured in  constant  prices,  the  private  consuaption-GDP
and investment-GDP ratios  declined  sLightLy  during  1993.13
V.1 Has  the  decline  in private  saving  been  cyclical  or structural?
One  possible  interpretation  for the  most recent  decline  in private
saving  is that it  is a cyclical  phenomenon.  In the  upswing,  there  is abundant
liquidity (ef  next para.)  which allows  consumers  to borrow  against  future
income;  while,  during  the  downturn,  liquidity  contracts  and  makes  liquidity
constraints  more  binding.  Under  this  interpretation,  the relaxation  of
liquidity  constraints  (increased  consumer's  access  to  credit)  brought  about  by
financial  liberalization,  improved  access  to foreign  capital  markets,  and
price  stabilization  (supported  by  strong  negative  net  public  borrowing)  made
possible  a  consumption  catch-up  effect.  13  The  fastest  growing  asset  of  the
domestic  commercial  banking  system  was  in  fact  consumer  credit.  Between  March
1989  and  April  1992,  consumer  credit  increased  236%  in  real terms  (about  50%
growth  per  annum  in  real  terms);  in  the  same  period  commercial  bank  credit  to
enterprises  increased  at  about  half  that  rate  and  credit  to  the  public  sector
was  cut  by  half.
Much  of  the  increase  in  consumption  in  this  case  stems  from  increases  in
purchases  of  durable  goods.  Durable  consumuption  growth  has  indeed  faster  than
non-durable  consumption  growth,  thus,  suggesting  that  the  measured  decline  in
private  saving  may  not  correspond  with  a  real  decline  (the  real  decline  has  to
measure  the  flow  of  services  derived  from  durables  rather  than  the  change  in
the  stock  of  durables).  However,  even  non-durable  private  consumption  grew
1.6  percentage  points  faster  than  GDP annually  over  the  1988-91  period,
indicating  that  there  was  still  a  decline  in  private  saving  that  has  to  be
13  See Ha-Oks  C1992).  According to the analysis  in  this  paper,  there  has  been a shift  in  the  Level
of  tiquidity  constraints  in  the  first  quarter  of  1990; this  shift  coincided  with  the  iuplemntation  of  the
Brady deal  for  foreign  debt  restructuring  CincLuding  a  substantiaL  reductioni.14
explained (note  that durable  consumption  in the  early 19SOs  was less than lIS
of total  consumption).
Large capital  inflows  can, in turn,  be viewed  as part of a portfolio
stock-adjustment  mechanism  which  induces  large  inflows  in the beginning  only.
Under this interpretation,  the real exchange  rate initially  appreciates  and,
if this is anticipated,  real interest  rates  also drop.  However,  as capital
inflows  slow  down  (and  at  some  point  in  the  future  they  are  possibly  reversed)
a  real  depreciation  is  required  and  higher  interest  rates  can  be  expected.
This  cycle of real exchange  rate appreciation/low  real interest  rates followed
by real exchange  rate depreciation/high  real interest  rates  is also likely  to
condition  consumption  behavior.  Cyclical  consumption  behavior  can  also  stem
from  exchange  rate-based  stabilizations  (cf.  Kiguel  and  Liviatan  (1992)).
it  is  of  course  possible  that  fast  consumptior  growth  [relative  to  GDP
growth)  until  1992  has  stemmed  from  permanent  income  expectations  based  on
future  (rather  than  current)  income  growth.  This,  in  turn,  could  have
resulted  from  large  capital  gains  on  assets,  e.g.,  on  the  stock  market  and  on
property.  However,  upward  revisions  of  permanent  income  may  have  been  over-
optimistic.  There  is  some  evidence  that  the  surge  in  stock  market  prices  in
Mexico  has  not  been  well explained  by  "fundamentals",  i.e.,  gains  in  the  stock
market  may  have  resulted  from  speculative  behavior  (cf.  Annex  1).14  If
consumers  feel  richer  out  of  their  speculative  (and,  hence,  transitory)
capital  gains  they  are  more  likely  to  spend  excessively.  Excessive  optimism
14  Cyclical  consumer  behavior  couLd aLso have  stemned  from overoptimistic  changes in  housing  wealth.
According  to  so..  estimates  C(a  and Oks (1992)),  changes  in  the  stock  af  housing  weatth  Caround  5  times
bigger  than  the  stock  market  capitalization)  amy have  explained  around  202  of  the  changes  in  private
cosumlption  during  th-  1980-91 period.  It  is  not  clear,  though,  whether the  same  type  of  specutative
behavior  observed in  equity  markets also  took  pLace in  housing mrkets.  A similar  C"qbbLe")  test  faited  to
identify  the  existence  of  speculative  behavior  Ccf.  Amex  1).  However, the  measure of  Wfundacentatso
employed,  rentaLs  pubtished  by the  centrat  bank,  mry  be disproportionateLy  influenced  by controLled  rents.15
during  the  upswing  is likely to be followed  by excessive  pesimism  during  the
downturn.
If  private saving  has indeed  been cyclical,  and the slight  contraction
in the  private consumption-GDP  ratio  in 1993 supports  this  hypothesis,  a
recessionary  period  is likely  to follow  unless:  i) the external  sector
compensates  for the fall in domestic  consumer  demand;  and/or  ii) investment
picks  up.
V.2  Cyclical  and  structural  factors  of  Mexico's  manufacturing  trade  balance
The  performance  of  Mexico's  manufacturing  trade  balance  over  recent
years  has  obeyed  to  both  structural  factors  (productivity  growth,  a  proxy  for
various  structural  reforms,  and  trade  liberalization,  which  affects
productivity  but  also  has  a  direct  impact  on  trade  flows)  and  cyclical  factors
(capacity  utilization,  foreign  demand  and  the  real  exchange  rate).  For
example,  on  one  hand,  it  is  possible  that  the  bulk  of  the  surge  of  imports
over  1989-93  was  driven  by  Mexico's  needs  to  modernize  its  capital  stock  and
that,  as  a  new  plateau  of  machinery  and  equipment  is  reached,  import  growth
will  tapper  off.  On  the  other  hand,  it  could  have  happened  that  as  a  result
of  the  strong  real  peso  appreciation,  Mexican  consumers/producers  have
substituted  foreign  production  of  consumer/intermediate  goods  for  domestically
produced  goods  (consumption  and  intermediate  goods  in  fact  represent  about  75t
of  all  imports  during  the  period).  In  this  case,  unless  there  is  a  cbange  in
the  external  competitiveness,  e.g.,  the  real  exchange  rate,  too  many  Mexican
goods  could  be  priced  out  of  the  market,  and  Mexico's  external  sector  may  not16
be  able  to  offset  the  likely  contractionary  effects  of  an  improvement  in
saving.
According  to an econometric  model  of Mexico's manufacturing  trade
balance (cf.  Annex 2), the largest  share of the recent  deterioration  of
Mexico's  manufacturing  trade  balance  was accounted  for by the  appreciation  of
Mexico's  real  exchange  rate (obtained  comparing  Mexican and US wages,  cf.
Figure  7).  According  to  our  simulations,  had  Mexican  dollar  wages  increased
at the rate of US inflation  since  the end  of 1988 (i.e.,  had  the real  exchange
rate remained  constant),  Mexico's  manufacturing  trade  balance  (including
maquila)  would have  been 58e smaller  than it actually  was in 1991.  15
One  argument  often  invoked  in  favor  of  Mexico's  external  competitiveness
is  that  the  real  exchange  rate  based  on  Mexican  wages  is  substantially  more
depreciated  than  what  the  exchange  rate  based  on  the  CPI  or  PPI  indices
suggest.  It  is  indeed  true  that  real  exchange  based  on  Mexican  wages  (and  the
Us  CPI  index)  is  substantially  more  depreciated  than  the  real  exchange  rate
based  on  the  CPI  price  index  (46%  between  1980  and  mid-1992  compared  to  7.41
according  to  a  trade  weighted  CPI-based  exchange  rate).  However,  a  measure  of
the  real  exchange  rate  based  on  wages  adjusted  for  gross  labor  productivity  in
manufacturing,  shows  that  in  1990  the  peso  was  only  20.4%  more  depreciated
than  in  1980  16;  this is only slightly  more than the 7.4%  real  depreciation
implied  by  the  CPI-based  real  exchange  rate.
According  to  our  simulations,  other  cyclical  factors  of  the
15 At the time this  econometric  analysis  was  done  Cmid-1992),  only quorterLy data to 1991  was
avaiLable.  The  period  covered  is  1980-91.
16 Note that  reaL wages  in  1950  were at  historicalty  very high  leveLs and the reaL exchange  rate that
year is  often viewed  as if  it  had been  overvaLued  (at  least  for  the  expansionist policies  of that  time).
Mexican  labor productivity  growth picked up sharply  in the earty  1990s,  but  so  did  average  reat wages.17
manufacturing  trade  balance in  our model played  a less  important role.  For
example,  if capacity  utilization  in manufacturing  would  have remained  at its
1987 level,  in 1991 the  manufacturing  trade  balance (excluding  naquila)  would
have been 10  smaller. And, had  US imports  growth  remained  at their  pre-
recession  levels,  Mexico's  manufacturing  trade  balance (including  maquila)
would  only  have  been 201  smaller  than it was in 1991.
Among  the  structural  factors  that  explain  the  decline  in  the
manufacturing  trade  balance  the  most  important  were  trade  liberalization  and
productivity  growth.  Reduction  of  quotas  on  intermediate  goods  exerted  a
negative  impact  and  the  reduction  of  quotas  on  capital  goods  exerted  a
positive  impact  on  the  trade  balance.  Substitution  of  foreign  intermediate
goods  for  domestic  intermediate  goods  explains  the  former  effect;  improved
access  to  capital  goods  explains  the  latter.  From  our  analysis  (cf.  Annex  2),
the  additional  reduction  of  the  two  types  of  quotas  implied  by  NAFTA would
lead  to  a  further  widening  of  the  manufacturing  trade  deficit  as  the  potential
impact  of  the  elimination  of  remaining  quotas  on  intermediate  goods  is  larger
than  the  potential  impact  of  elimination  of  remaining  quotas  on  capital
goods.  17
Productivity  growth  also  exerted  a  positive  impact  on  the  manufacturing
trade  balance.  The  acceleration  of  total  factor  productivity  growth  since  the
mid-1980s suggests  that  trade  liberalization,  which  started  in  1985,  combined
with deregulation  and other  reforms  have  played  an  important  role.  18
However,  according  to  some  estimates,  despite  the  improvement,  total  factor
17  Note,  however, that  the  modeL  is  a short-term  model and nay thus  not  capture  welt  a  possibte
stock-adjustmnt  of  capital  good inports.
is  See  Tybcut-lestbrook  C1992).18
productivity  growth  in manufacturing  was relatively  low: 21 on average in
1985-87  and 2.81 in 1988-90.  39  Comparative  measures  of gross  labor
productivity  growth  are discouraging  as well.  For example,  gross labor
productivity  growth  was low  when compared  with South  E.At Asian countries,
Mexico's  most relevant  competitors  in US markets.  20  Even comparisons  with
developed  countries  do not raise optimism:  over the 1985-90  post-trade
liberalization  period,  Mexico's  gross  labor  productivity  growth  averaged  3.71,
the same as the US but less than the 4.11 average  rate of the  U.K or the 4.51
average  rate of Japan (Figure  8).  Manufacturing  labor  productivity  growth
accelerated  in the early  1990s.  However,  based  on our simulations,  even if
productivity  would  have  grown  at  twice  the  rate  it  actually  grew over the
1980s,  Mexico's  manufacturing  trade  deficit  (excluding  maquila)  would  have
only  been  19% smaller  in  1991.
In  short,  structural  factors  are  unlikely  to  help  reverse  recent  trends
in Mexico's  trade balance,  at least  over the  short  to  medium  term.  While
consolidation  of reforms  is likely  to enhance  average  productivity  growth,  an
improvement  in Mexico's  manufacturing  trade balance  will have to come from
cyclical  factors  such  as  higher  foreign  demand  and,  particularly,  an
improvement  in  Mexico's  real  exchange  rate.
19 See  F. CLavijo C1992).
20 our  masure of  gross Labor  productivity  is based  on hours uorked in  the manufacturing  sector
provided by the *Secretaria de Trab.jow and the  mnnufacturing  output index provided by the  Bank  of  Mexico.19
V.3 Can higher  investment  nick up the slack in consumer  demand?
Private  investment  has been an important  component  of Mexico's  1989-92
recovery.  Over this  period,  private fixed  investment  averaged  13.5%  real
growth,  that  is,  about  four  times  faster  than  average  output  growth.  The
foreign  investment  trend  is even  more impressive:  total  foreign investment
(including  portfolio  investment)  increased  from US$2.6  billion  in 1968  to an
estimated  US$33.3  billion in 1993.
Although  strong  investment  activity  appears to have  been driven  mainly
by structural  factors (privatization,  trade  and financial  liberalization,
deregulation  and improved  access  to foreign  capital  markets),  cyclical  factors
are likely  to have played  an important  role too.  One of such cyclical  factors
is  the  real  exchange  rate  .21  Another  is,  of  course,  the  economic  cycle  per
se.  The  real  peso  appreciation  that  resulted  from  large  capital  inflows  has
encouraged  investment  both  by  reducing  the  cost  of  capital  good  imports  and
through  lower  interest  rates.  As  capital  inflows  slow  down and  the  real
exchage  rate depreciates (cf.  Subsection  V.1), the reverse  can be expected:
the  higher cost  of imported  capital  and higher  interest  rates  will discourage
investment.
It is thus  possible  that the real  peso appreciation  was perceived  as
transitory. In this case, some firms  may have stepped  up investment  in
imported  capital  goods from fear of a real  peso depreciation  later (or  a
reversal  of trade  regime),  thus,  exacerbating  the cyclical  pattern  of
investment. Note that if the  real peso appreciation  was initially  perceived
21  Based on  the portfoLio  stock  adjustment  hypothesis,  the real exchange  rate  is  LikeLy  to  exhibit  a
cyclical  behavior  (cf.  sibsection  V.1).20
to  be temporary,  a slowdown  of investment  growth from this source  would  be
most likely  in the future (as  the opportunity  to buy  cheap comes  to an end).
The macroeconomic  implication  is that a cyclical  pick-up  in investment
is  unlikely  to lead the recovery  over the short  term.  However,  a deepening  of
reform  in the context  of NAFTA, reduced  political  uncertainty  after  the 1994
presidential  elections,  and  overall low price stability  are likely,  over the
medium  term, to prompt  a recovery  of investment.
Digression:  NAFTA.  the exchanae  rate and investment.
It is often  argued  that low Mexican  wages  will be the  key to massive
investment  in  Mexico (possibly  including  the relocation  of many  US firms)  and
that, in view of this investment,  there is scope for substantial  further  real
appreciation  of the  peso.  However,  while the unadjusted  ratio  of average  US-
Mexico  manufacturing  wages  was 5.23 in 1991,22  the productivity-adjusted
ratio  was in the same year 1.026,  i.e., the relevant  wage differential  (or
unit labor cost  differetial)  was actually  quite small or virtually  non-
existent  in  1992.  This  implies  that  a  further  real  peso  appreciation
(measured  through  wages)  could  strongly  erode  Mexican  external  competitiveness
22  This  incLudes  fringe  benefits  in  the  case of  Nexico.  The source  for  Mexico  is  IKEGI  and the
concept  is  average  compensation  per  emptoyee in  manufacturing  C"Remuneracion  media por  persona ocupada en et
sector  manufacturero");  the  1991 figure  was 72,088 pesos per  day which,  divided  by
the  average peso-dolLar  ER  of  1991 (301B.4),  is  USS23.58.  Hourly  compensation in  the  US was obtained  from
the  US  Department of  Labor  (March,  1993) and was USS15.6 in  1991;  we converted  this  into  a daiLy  figure  by
multiplying  it  by  the  8 hours  of  a working  day,  so  that  the  daily  average  compensation per  empLoyee  in
manufacturing  was US$124.8 in 1991.
23  Manufacturing  output  per  employee in  the  US was in  1991 1SS70,384 and in  Mexico USS13,824.  The US
figure  is  the  ratio  of  value  added by manufacturing  (USStr 1.32205  in  1990 muLtiplied  by  the  ratio  of  the
1991-90 US industriaL  production  index  of  IMF-IFS and multipLied  by  the  ratio  of  the  1991-90 US producer
price  index  INF-IFS,  i.e.,  LUSStr. 1.29665 in  1991),  and 1991 US manufacturing  employment  C1B,455,000). The
Mexican figure  is  the  ratio  of  manufacturing  GDP  in  1991 (pesos bn.  189399.8 divided  by 3,018.4,  the  1991
peso-dottar  ER, i.e.,  USSmi.62,748),  and mnaufacturing  emptoyment  (4,493,279,  manufacturing  empLoyment
according  to  the  1990 Census, times  the  ratio  of  the  1991-90 nrniufacturing  employment index  of  Bank of
Mexico,  i.e.,  4,538,832).21
unless  offset  by increases  in the  productivity  growth differential  of similar
magnitude.  It also  means  that,  under  NAFTA, there  are  important  opportunities
for  new investment  in  activities  that contribute  to increase  Mexico's
productivity  growth  differential  vie a vis the  US and Canada.  Such activities
include investment  in  machinery  and eqdipment  that brings, associated  with it,
substantial  skills  enhancement,  as well as investment  in infrastructure  and,
more generally,  in the  service  sector (the  latter  are essential  inputs  for
tradable  activities).  24  The service  sector  has  been relatively  more close  to
foreign  competition  and,  to  that  extent,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  bulk of
foreign  direct  investment  into  Mexico  (about  80s)  over  the  early  1990s  has
gone into this sector.  25
In  short,  while  NArTA is  likely  to have a strong  impact  Oi  investment,
the  magnitude  of  this  impact  will  be  driven  more  by  opportunities  to  increase
productivity  than  by the  absolute  wage differential  per se.  To that extent,
opportunities  for investment  are likely  to be found  across a wide spectrum  of
activities  (including  services)  and  not, as anti-NAPTA  forces  in the  US
presumed,  mainly  in  manufacturing.  This  is  important  because it  implies  that
job  losses  in  the  US are  less likely;  in fact,  to the extent that the  bulk of
US  investment  in  MexLco  over  recent  years  has  been  in  services,  it  implies
that  more  (not  leas)  US  jobs  are  likely.
24 of  course, closing  the productivity  gap tand, thus, the wage  gap) giLL take a Long  time and wiLl
invotve ms  weLt  (among  other things)  substantiat  institutionaL  deveLopments  to  reduce regulatory.
uncertainty,  increase competition and boost factor  mobility,  incLuding more Labor  market fLexibiLity.
25  This  is,  by the way, one reason  for  which much  of  the NAFTA  discussion in  terms of  the loss of  US
manufacturing  jobs to Mexico  was  missguided.22
VI.  Conclusions.
Mexico's  experience  with capital  markets  bas gone through  a remarkable
series  of transformations  over the  past two  decades.  A stable  period  of high
growth,  low inflation  and prudent external  borrowing  came to an end when oil
revenues  and populist  leaders triggered  a dash for fiscal  expansion  well
beyond  the limits  posed by the  new revenue  constraints. This expansion  came
to a crashing  halt in 1962, an event  that  waa clearly  anticipated  by private
individuals  in  Mexico: capital flight  in fact started  to take off well before
the debt crisis.  Intriguingly,  commercial  banks  continued  to lend long after
alarmbells  should  have gone off: Mexico's  debt was rising  much faster  than
GDP, towards 1980  external interest  rates  turned  sharply  up, well in excess  of
Mexico's  growth  rates,  and oil prices,  after  their initial  jump in 1979,  fell
almost  as  fast  as  they  rose  earlier.
All this came to an end during  the  debt crisis,  a crisis  which was in
fact set off by Mexico's  suspension  of interest  payments in  August 1982.  The
next decade  clearly  left no opportunity  to continue  as before.  It is to
Mexico's  credit  that  her leaders saw this early  and embarked  on a difficult
but  ultimately  spectacularly  successful  reform  program.  International  capital
markets  did not give Mexico the breathing  space  needed  to  bridge  the  period
between  the  up  front  costs  of  the  program  and  the  eventual  benefits;  between
1982  and  1990,  Mexico  had  to  rely  almost  exclusively  on  international
institutions  like  the  World  Bank  for  external  finance.
This  situation  changed  drastically  in  1989/1990,  when  Mexico  became  the
first  country  to  conclude  a  "Brady  deal".  Contrary  to  convential  wisdom,  the
partial  write  down  of  the  commercial  banks'  debt  opened  the  flood  gates  in23
terms  of capital  inflows  into  Mexico.  In this paper we have shown  that
reduced future  uncertainty,  more than reduced future  transfors,  explain  this
spectacular  success  of the debt reduction  package.
The massive capital  inflows  into  Mexico in the years following  the Brady
deal clearly  have an element  of stock  adjustment  to them.  Two reasons  for
this view  stand out.  First,  a large  part of the inflows  were in response  to
the  privatization  program,  particularly  the selling  off of the  telephone
company  (TELMEX)  and the commercial  banks.  But this program  is now (late
1992)  by and large completed.  Second,  we  demonstrated  that  a  large  part  of
the capital  inflow  consisted  not so much of foreigners  investing  in Mexico,
but of Mexicans  bringing  their flight  capital  back in.  And since  this can
only  be done once,  the  current  rate of inElows  must be considered  temporary.
This  is a potential  source  of concern,  since  at the same  time Mexico's
current  account  has  deteriorated  to  an extent  unparallell,d  in Mexican
history.  Once  the  capital  stops  flowing,  should  we  expect  the  current  account
to improve  or is Mexico  heading for  a major BoP crisis?  To answer  this
question  we  surveyed  the  macroeconomic  counterparts  of  the  current  account
deterioration,  domestic  saving  and investment.
Private  saving  has declined  sharply  over 1988-92 (well  in excess  of he
improvemet  in public saving);  as  a  result  of  it, at the  1993 domestic  saving
levels,  the relaively  fast rates  of growth  of 1989-92  were no longer
sustainable.  However,  private  saving  is  likely  to  improve  in  the  future.  The
sudden  relaxation  of liquidity  constraints  in  1989/9O  unlocked  some  pent  up
consumer  demand  that is  likely  to  slow  down  as  time  goes  by;  there  is  evidence
that  some  of  the  consumer  boom  was  based  on  asset  price  developments  that  are
not  supported  by  underlying  fundamentals  ("bubbles");  since  these  bubbles  are24
in fact  now  defusing,  the  associated  consumer  binge is likely  to come to an
end. Both arguments  lead  to cautious  optimism  about  the  chances  of a recovery
in  private  savings.
As to investment,  prospects  over  the  medium  term also  remain  sound,  but
a temporary  slowdown  in  investment  is likely. The latter  may be associated,
in  part,  to the  1993  output  downturn  and,  in part,  to the  possible  correction
in the  real exchange  rate (which,  in fact,  began  to  materialize  during  the
first  half of 1994). All this  adds  up to a likely  current  account  improvement
in the foreseeable  future.
Finally,  while  an  improvement  of private  saving  is indeed  desirable  over
the  medium  term,  it  will  exacerbate  recessionary  pressures  in  the  near  future.
In  view  of  some  downward  price/wage  inflexibility  and  Mexico's  still
relatively  rigid  exchange  rate  policy,  26 slowdown  pressures  could  turn into
a  recession  (as  it  already  happened  during  the  second  half  of  1993).  Due  to
Mexico's  strong  anti-inflation  comittment,  a  substantial  flexibilization  of
exchange  rate  policy  appears  unlikely  in  the  short  term.
However,  Mexico's  fortunes  will  ultimately  depend  strongly  on  external
developments  such  as  a  stronger  US and  world  economic  recovery,  on  further
advances  in  the  implementation  of  NAPTA  and  the  reform  program,  and  on  reduced
political  uncertainties  after  the  1994  elections  are  over.  All  these  factors
could  eventually  prompt  higher  investment;  if,  in  addition,  external
competitiveness  improves,  a  gradual  improvement  in  private  saving  may  be
achieved  along  with  moderate  growth  and  further  consolidation  of  inflation
gains.
26 Since November,  1991,  Mexico  has an exchange  rate band, with a floor  that  is  fixed  and  a cefling
uhich has bee  depreciated  at an anal  rate between  4X  and 5X in  1993-94.25
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ANNEX 1.  Asset  Market  Stability.27
The  approach  consists  in  comparing  two  prices, the  actual  price  (P)  and
the  fundamental  price  (P').  If  agents  are  rational,  it  follows  that:
PC=  E(PrIr})  (31)
From  the  definition  of  P', it  follows  that
p.1  = pt  + u, (2)
where
E(u.:pZ)  =  o  (3)
This  is the  key rational  expectations  insight,  the basis  of the  Shiller (1981)
test.  The  difference  between  the fundamental  and the  actual  price  should  be
uncorrelated  with  the  current  price.  Taking  variances  on  both  sides  of
equation  (2),  we obtain
V(p,  =  V(P) 4  V(u) (4)
which  implies
V(P)  2  V(P)  (5)
Equation  (5)  is  the  inequality  initially  tested  by  Shiller.  It  says  that  the
variance  of  the  fundamental  price  should  exceed  the  variance  of  the  actual
price.  The  intuition  is  that  since  P  is  a  forecast  of  P',  it  should  move  less
than  PI.  Stiler  uses  US data  and  finds  that  the  variance  inequality  is
dramatically  violated:  the  estimated  ratio  v(P)/V(P')  is  often  in excess  of 5.
27  Tis  annex  was  prepared  by  Jiming  Ha while  working  as  a  sumner  intern  for  the  Mexico  Country
Cperations  Division  at  the  World  Dank  during  1992.27
To  calculate  the  fundamental  price,  we use  the  formula  (19)
p',  de.,  (6)
4  (3. +  r)  1
r is the  average  real  interest  rate  from  1989  to 1991,  and  d is dividends  in
the  case  of equity  and  rent  in the  case  of  housing.
The  actual  price  is  then  regressed  on  the  fundamental  price  with  twelve
lags.  The  fitted  value  of  the  dependent  variable  is  then  treated  as  the  price
of  the  stock  that  depends  on  fundamentals.  The  variance  (standard  deviation)
of  both  the  actual  price  and  the  price  that  depends  on  fundamentals  is
calculated.  If  the  ratio  of  the  variance  of  the  actual  price  to  the  variance
of  the  price  that  depends  on  the  fundamentals  is  greater  than  2  there  is  a
*bubble";  otherwise,  there  is  no  bubble.
For  equity,  the  standard  deviation  of  the  actual  price  (43.027)  was  more
than  twice  the  standard  deviation  of  the  price  that  depends  on  fundamentals
(21.474).  Thus,  we  conclude  that  equity  markets  in Mexico were in a bubble.
For  houses,  the  standard  deviation  of the  actual  price (36.411)  was  close  to
the standard  deviation  of the  price  that  depends  on fundamentals  (32.467).
Thus,  there  is  no evidence  of speculative  behavior  in housing.28
ANNEX 2. Cyclical  and Structural  Factors  of Muxico's
Manufacturing  Trade  Balance.
The record  of Mexican  manufacturing  exports  has been impressive:  they
increased  from US$3 billion  in 1980  to US$16  billion in 1991 (US$20  billion
including  the  maquila).  However,  over the 1988-91 "recovery"  period  Mexico's
manufacturing  trade  balance  has deteriorated  sharply  from  a US$2 billion
deficit  in 1987 to a US$19.5  billion  deficit  in 1991 (or,  including  maquila,
from a  US$0.4 billion  deficit  to a US$15.3  billion  deficit). Concerns  about
this  trend  have  been  growing  due  to  the  recent  deceleration  of  manufacturing
output  growth,  to  around  2t  in  the  first  half  of  1992.
An  econometric  approach  was  followed  to  analyze  manufacturing  trade
performance  over  the  1950-91  period.  Regressions  were  rin  using  Ordinary
Least  Squares;  quarterly  data  was  employed.  The  final  regressions,  obtained
after  sequentially  eliminating  all  statistically  insignificant  regressors,  are
ft-statistics  are  shown  in  parenthesis):
(1) TBMAN  =  -13.711  - 0.616*CU  +  36.897*TFP  +  54.787*QINT
(-0.79)  (-5.99)  (2.80)  (3.21)
- 29.001*QCAP  +  0.377*RER  - 0.569*w
(-2.40)  (2.31)  (-7.87)
R2 - 0.96  D-W 3  2.09  F-statistic  =  162.229
(2)  TBMM - 25.044 - 0.722*CU +  15.866*QINT  - 30.138USK  - 0.584*W
(2.17)  (-6.91)  (4.96)  (-4.65)  (-13.58)
ft 2 . 0.95  D-W - 2.08  F-statistic - 212.5
where:
TBMAN  non-oil  manufacturing  trade  balance  (in  constant  US dollars)
TBMM  TEMAN  plus  balance  on  maquila  account
C  constant  term
CU  capacity  utilization  in  manufacturing
QfNT  import  quotas  on  intermediate  goods
QCAP  import  quotas  on  capital  goods
RER  ratio  of  US import  price  index  to  dollar  price  index
of  Mexico  manufacturing  exports
w  real  exchange  rate  deflated  by  the  dollar  price  index  of  Mexico
manufacturing
exports  and  the  domestic  manufacturing  wage  index
USM  US imports  in  constant  dollars
TFP  total  factor  productivity
A  distinction  is  made  between  short-term  (cyclical)  and  long-term
(structural)  factors  of  the  non-oil  manufacturing  trade  balance  (with  and
without  maquila).  of  the  cyclical  factors,  the  following  have  exerted  a
significant  impact  on  manufacturing  trade  balance  over the  1980-91  period:
capacity  utilization,  foreign  demand  (US imports)  and  the  real  exchange  rate
(based  on  a  dollar  price  index  of  Mexico's  manufacturing  exports  and  Mexico's30
manufacturing  wages).  26  The two  significant  structural  factors  were:
productivity  growth (total  factor  productivity)  29  and trade  liberalization
(captured  by quotas  on capital  and intermediate  good imports). The simulated
impact  of these factors  is discussed  below.  All simulations  are within  sample
simulations  in which  the  actual  value of one  of the regressors  is replaced  by
a hypothetical  value (discussed  below)  while the other regressors  keep their
actual  values.  The  estimated  impact  on  the dependent  variable  of hypothetical
changes  in  the  regressors  is  summarized  in  Table  1.
It  follows  that  productivity  growth  will  not,  by  itself,  reverse  recent
trends  in Mexico's  manufacturing  trade  balance  over  the  short-  to  medium-term.
while  consolidation  of  reforms  and  maturing  of  recent  investments  is  likely  to
enhance  average  productivity  growth,  an  improvement  in  Mexico's  manufacturing
trade  balance  will,  over  the  short  to  medium  term,  have  to  come  from  cyclical
factors:  a decline  of  domestic  demand  with  respect  to  foreign  demand,  and/or
an improvement  in Mexico's  real exchange  rate.  The implication  is that  if a
slowdown  in capital  inflows  indeed  materializes  under a fixed  exchange  rate
regime  and under unchanged  wage flexibility  either  a strong  us recovery  or a
severe  slowdown  in  Mexico  will  be  required  to restore external  balance.
2S  Other  short-term factors  tested were not statisticalty  significant:  public  inve_tment,  domestic
real  interest  rates and  US  GDP. The ratio  of  Mexican  non-oi L manufacturing  goods  prices  to the price  index
of all  US iWorts  ias  onLy  partially  significant  (at  an 855  Level of  confidence].
29  Total  factor  productivity  was obtained from Hernandez  Laos, Enrique "Evolucion de La Productividad
Totat  de los  Factores en La Economia mexian  (1970-1989)",  May  1992, Mexico, unpubLished report.  However,
since this  study has estimates for  up  to  1989  onLy, for  the  sub-period 1990-91 we empLoyed  a measure  of
gross labor productivity  in  manufacturing  based  an Bank of  Mexico's "Indicadores"  empLoying  an index of
manufacturing  output  and manufacturing  eaployment.31
Table  (Annex).  Simulated  Imoact  of  Hypothetical  Chanoes  in  Rweressors.
Percentage chanae of  Evoothesis about Recressor
TEMAN at end of 1991
1.  -101  CU remains  at  end  of  1987  level
2.  -19%  . TFP grows twice as fast
Percentage chanue of  HYEothetsis about Regressor
T2MM at end of 1991
1.  -20%  USM  remain  at  1989  level
2.  -56%  W remains  at  end  of  1988  level32
Table 1: Resource Flows  (USg  millions).
DEBT  FLOWS  NON-DEBT FLOWS
Official  Private  Total  a)  DFI  b)  Portfolio  TOTAL
Creditors  Creditors  a)+b)  Investment  FLOWS
1970  141.70  571.02  316.24  316.24  0.00  1D28.96
1971  85.90  582.48  324.15  324.15  0.00  992.53
1972  145.10  468.87  291.20  281.20  0.00  895.17
1973  172.60  2163.38  363.02  363.02  0.00  2696.99
1974  325.40  3734.49  549.55  549.55  0.00  4609.43
1975  380.80  5102.58  505.02  505.02  0.00  5988.40
1976  300.70  5423.67  517.04  517.04  0.00  6241.40
1977  301.90  2671.54  540.33  540.33  0.00  3513.77
1978  257.80  3120.96  826.85  826.85  0.00  4205.61
1979  283.10  5080.37  1331.83  1331.83  0.00  6695.30
1960  794.90  9736.90  2155.08  2155.08  0.00  12686.69
1986  933.60  26847.32  2835.67  2835.67  0.00  30616.59
1982  1620.10  7299.47  1657.30  1657.30  0.00  10576.87
1963  -275.90  2109.53  460.50  460.50  0.00  2294.13
1984  836.06  831.09  391.10  391.10  0.00  2058.25
1985  809.33  -1732.82  490.47  490.47  0.00  -433.02
1966  1478.60  -1330.27  1521.96  1521.96  0.00  1670.29
1967  888.80  85.47  3247.62  3247.62  0.00  4221.89
1988  997.00  -3285.97  2594.65  2594.65  0.00  305.66
1985  937.00  -259.72  3530.24  3035.90  493.34  4207.5233
1990  4175.00  7717.42  4627.72  2633.24  1994.48  16520.13
1991  1554.00  7948.24  14632.00  4761.50  9870.00  24134.00
1992  2031.00  5005.00  19919.00  5366.00  13553.00  259SS.00
1993  33331.00  4900.00  28431.00  30882.00
gource: Bank  of  Mexico.34
Table  2.  Macroeconomic  Sources  of  the  Current  Account-Deficit  1992  vs  198B-69
(percentage  points  of  GDP)
1.  Decline  in  Current
Account  Balance  4.6
2.  Increase  in
Public  Saving  4.0
3.  Increase  in  Total
Investment  2.2
4. Decline in Private
Saving  (m  1 + 2 - 3)  6.4
Note. Based on current price data. Source. INEGI and Bank of Mexico.35
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